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immediately  if  a  debt  crisis  is  to  be  avoided  in  the  medium  run.  We 









Cut budget  deficits  by  controlling  spending and  increasing  taxes.  This 
would keep fiscal policy  consistent with exchange rate policy. 
Maintain an anti-inflationary posture in monetary policy. 
Amend  the  balanced  budget  rule  to  allow  internal  financing  of 
government  deficits.  The deepening of  the domestic market  in  govern- 
ment securities would make open-market operations by the central bank 
easier. The addition of this monetary tool to SBI and SBPU would tend to 
enhance monetary control, and thus macroeconomic  stabilization efforts, 
tremendously. 
Accelerate  the development of  the domestic  financial system. Financial 
deepening  could  be  boosted  by  the  privatization  of  many  of  the 
state-owned  enterprises.  The debt  situation  would  be  improved  if  the 
government  were  to allow  foreigners  to purchase  shares in  the former 
state enterprises. 
Liberalize  controls  on  foreign  investments  in  the  manufacturing  and 
agricultural  sectors, especially  in  industries  that  produce  primarily  for 
export  markets.  In  short,  state  and  private  enterprises  should  issue 
equities instead of bonds to foreign investors when financing their capital 
expenditure. 
Eliminate the  wide  array  of  monopoly  import  licenses.  The growth  of 
manufactured  exports, spurred  by  access  to cheaper inputs,  would  not 
only  increase  foreign  exchange earnings but  would  also  diversify  the 
export bundle, hence reducing the sensitivity of the DSR to the prices of 
a few key commodity exports. 
Expand  the  tree  crop  sector.  In  addition  to  earning  more  foreign 
exchange, the strategy of  accelerating  the growth of  agricultural  export 
industries would also promote a more equitable, rural-urban-as  well as 
inter-island-growth  pattern, and ease population  pressure  on the urban 
areas. 
Political and Economic 
Instability, 1950- 65 
2.1  Introduction 
Indonesia  achieved  formal  recognition  of  its political  independence in 
December 1949 after a bitter, four-year struggle against the Dutch. President 
Soekamo was the dominant political figure in the 1950-65 period. The years 33  IndonesidChapter 2 
from 1950 to 1959 are usually referred to as the period of liberal democracy 
when President Soekarno shared power with elected representatives. He was 
the only durable presence, however; the extreme fragmentation of  political 
opinions brought about twelve cabinet changes in ten years. The corollary of 
this constant reshuffling of ministerial portfolios is that government policies 
toward economic development were in a constant state of flux. 
Needless to say, the continuous jockeying for power by various coalitions 
diminished public respect and support for parliamentary democracy. In June 
1959 President Soekarno, with the support of the army, centralized political 
power  in  his  hands  by  dismissing  the  elected  representatives.  The 
parliamentary  seats were reassigned to representatives of  regional interests 
and of  “functional”  groups. Examples of the latter are youth and women’s 
groups,  and  religious,  labor,  and  peasant  organizations.  This  form  of 
“guided democracy”  lasted until October 1965 when the armed forces took 
over after suppressing a communist coup. 
During the  1960-65  period Indonesia continually faced fiscal and trade 
problems, in addition to unemployment problems resulting from a high rate 
of  population  growth. The root  of  the fiscal problem was ever-increasing 
budget deficits. Since tax revenues could not rise as fast as expenditures and 
governments were unable to curtail spending, the deficits had to be financed 
by  money  creation.  Government revenue  was  heavily  dependent  on  the 
taxing of  international trade. These trade taxes reduced profitability in the 
trade  sector, cut  real  wages,  and  increased (disguised) unemployment, at 
least in the short run. High inflation and high domestic costs of  production 
made  exports  uncompetitive in  international markets.  Occasional bans  of 
some export commodities to stabilize their prices in the domestic market and 
the trade breaks with Singapore and Malaysia since 1963 made Indonesia an 
unreliable  source  of  traded  goods.  All  of  these  factors  made  Indonesia 
unable to translate its export potential into actual earnings. 
2.2  The Course and Causes of Inflation 
The episodes of economic development in Indonesia during 1950-65  can 
be divided into three phases, 1950-57,  1958-61,  and 1962-65.  Despite the 
political  instability  and  destruction  during  the  Pacific  War  and  the 
Revolution,  the  economy  performed  quite  well  during  the  first  phase. 
Measured at  1955 constant market prices,  the average annual growth rate 
was a respectable 5.4 percent per annum, and the average inflation rate was 
16.5 percent per year (table 2.1). The trade sector was badly hit by a decline 
in the terms of  trade after the Korean War boom. Despite that, the average 
current account  deficit  during this  period  was  less than  1 percent  of  the 
national income. 
Table 2.1 shows that  1951 was the only year the government ever had a 
budget  surplus.  Since then,  the  budget  has  always  been  in  deficit.  The 
average  amount  of  this  deficit  during  1951-57  was  1.5 percent  of  the Table  2.1  Selected Economic Indicators,  1951-69 
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13.1 Annual  Averages 
1%3  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1%9  1951-57  1958-61  1%2-65  1951-65 
Growth rates 
National income  -2.4 
Inflation  128.8 
Exports'  5.2 
Imports'  -  19.4 
Money supply  93.8 
As percentage of national income 
Government revenue  5.1 
Government expendihm  10.3 
Government deficitb  -5.2 
Current account  -  .3 
Imports  .7 
Exports  1.0 
Exchange rate (Rp/US$)'  - 
Prices of  export goodsd 
Rubber (USGlkg)  191.8 
Tin (US$/metric ton)  8,586.0 
Coffee (USe/kg)  299.0 
Income velocity of  money  16.1 
3.8  .O 
156.3  282.5 
135.3  594.5 
3.8  -2.3 
30.4  2.2 
4.0  3.9 
9.6  10.7 
-5.6  -6.8 
-.l  -  .2 
.4  -  .6 
.5  .6 
-  235.0 
177.9  184.0 
11,436.0  12,977.0 
361.1  356.3 
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Sources:  BPS, Statisticul Pocketbook of Indonesia. 1960-71  editions. Bank Indonesia, Report of  the Governor, various issues covering financial years 1950151 through 1960/65, 
IMF  and World Bank databases. 
Note: Dash indicates that data were not available. 
'In  foreign currency (US  $). 
bMinus sign indicates a deficit. 
Wfficial exchange rates at Jakarta. 
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national  income.  The  Bank  Indonesia Act  of  1953 restrained the  use  of 
deficit financing to  a level equal at most  to  five times the amount of  the 
nation’s gold and foreign exchange reserves. Inflation during this phase was 
largely due to positive external shocks. The rise in exports because of  the 
Korean War  boom  in  1950-51  increased domestic income as  well  as the 
monetary base. 
As  shown  in  table  2.1, the  rates  of  growth  of  the  money  supply  and 
inflation rates fluctuated sharply during  1950-57,  reflecting the efforts of 
various  governments to  check  the  inflation  rate.  The  exceptional rate  of 
growth of  the  money  supply  in  1954 was  related  to  the  rising  campaign 
expenditures of  various political parties for the general election in 1955, the 
first  to  be  held  after achieving independence. The incumbent  government 
expanded bank credit and used the trade licensing system to, in essence, buy 
political supporters. 
Inflation during the second phase,  1958-61,  was primarily  related  to  a 
combination  of  a  supply  shock  and  a  sharp  increase  in  government 
expenditures. These simultaneous adverse events were the result of, first, the 
twin  rebellions in  1958 on the wealthy, export-earning islands of  Sumatra 
and Sulawesi and, second, the nationalization of  foreign-owned firms and 
expulsion  of  expatriate  managers  and  technicians  in  1957-58.  The 
combination of inflation, widespread trade licensing, and unrealistic multiple 
exchange  rates  reduced  profitability  in  the  traded  sector,  thus  creating 
disincentives for the transfer of  productive resources in  that  direction.  As 
shown in table 2.la, the margin between official and market exchange rates 
became wider over time. The fall in production and exports eroded the tax 
base and reduced government tax revenue, both in real and nominal terms. 
At the same time, the rebellions created pressure for an expansion of military 
expenditures  to  restore  political  unity.  The  size  of  the  budget  deficit 
increased dramatically, and expenditure allocation for investment purposes 
was reduced substantially. 
The  combination  of  supply  shocks  and  pressure  for  higher  budget 
expenditures  accelerated  during  1962-65.  The  political  conflict  with 
Singapore and  Malaysia  in  1963 led  to  a  break  of  trade  which  further 
reduced  exports.  This was  because Singapore and Penang were important 
entrepdt ports for Indonesian exports. As  shown in table 2.1, the ratio of 
exports  to  GDP  declined  from  8.7  percent  (1951-57)  to  6.8  percent 
(1958-61),  and then to 1.1 percent during the third phase (1962-65). 
The  1962-65  period  was  marked  by  an  intensified  contest  for  power 
among the president, the army, and the PKI. The contest was reflected in the 
making  of  policy,  the  exercise  of  patronage,  and  control  over  financial 
resources. As  the struggle for budget allocation became more of a political 
dispute than a technical one, the political and administrative control of  the 
Ministry of  Finance declined. Since 1959 many ministries maintained extra 
budgets which were not reported in the budget document. The president and 37  IndonesidChapter 2 
Table 2.la  Exchange Rates (rupiahRT.S. dollar) 
Year  Market Rates  Year  Market Rates 
1946  2.7  1961  45.0' 
1947  2.7  45  .Oa-  72.  Ob 
1948  2.7  200.W 
1949  3.8  1962  45.0-173.0' 
1950  3.8  45.0-270.0b 
1951  3.8  900.0- 1 ,170.OC 
1952  11.4-1 1.7  1963  NA 
1953  11.4-1 1.7  1964  NA 
1954  11.4  1965  235.06 
1955  11.4  235.V 
1956  11.4- 13.6=  235.0' 
1957  22.7"  1966  235.0' 
28.4-42.6b  235.F 
56.8-78.1'  235.0' 
1958  30.3'  1967  235.06 
37.9-56.gb  235.0' 
75.8-104.2'  153.7' 
1959  36.P  1%8  326.0' 
45.0-67Sb  326.0' 
90.0-135.0'  300.1' 
1960  45.0'  I969  326.e 
45.0-72.0b  326.05 
200.w  326.6 
Source:  International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
aF'rincipal export rates. 
bPrincipai import rates. 
'Other  import rates. 
'The  end-of-period national currency value of  the SDR. 
'Refers  to end-of-period market exchange rates for countries quoting rates in units of national currency per 
U  .  S . dollar. 
'Refers  to period averages of  market exchange rates for countries quoting rates in units of  national currency 
per U.S.  dollar. 
NA:  not available. 
his cabinet ministries controlled the so-called Revolution Fund which  was 
financed separately from the reported government revenues. The use of  this 
fund was not reported to anybody but the president. During the later part of 
the  term  of  President  Soekamo,  the  government did  not  even  bother  to 
submit its draft budget proposal to get approval from the parliament. 
The supply of  money and the inflation rate accelerated during 1962-64. 
In  this period, both the money supply and the cost-of-living index roughly 
doubled every year, and by the end of  1965 they were doubling every few 
weeks. In May 1957 the government enacted Emergency Law No. 14 which 
freed Bank Indonesia from its obligation to maintain the 20 percent cover on 
gold and foreign exchange reserves. In  1965 Bank Indonesia merged with 
three of  the four existing state commercial banks and the sole state-owned 
savings  bank  to  form  Bank  Negara  Indonesia.  With  these  changes,  the 38  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
government budget deficits were automatically financed by  credit from the 
central bank. 
The government made some effort to finance its budget deficits by selling 
bonds to the general public in the early 1950s. The Jakarta stock exchange, 
which  was  closed  during  the  Pacific  War,  reopened  on  4  June  1952. 
However, because of the public’s unfamiliarity with the stock exchange and 
because of their preference for other forms of assets, the government was not 
able to raise any significant amount of funds through the stock exchange. 
The erosion of  real  value by  high  inflation helped make financial assets, 
including government bonds, unattractive. 
2.3  The Government Budget 
None of the coalition governments during the period of liberal democracy 
(1950-59)  had  an adequate mandate to take bold measures, nor survived 
long  enough  to  implement  an  economic stabilization program.  The  key 
element  in  the  contest  for  power  within  the  coalition  was  the  budget 
allocations. For example, one of the prime ministers, Wilopo, failed to prune 
back the personnel budget in  1952 because of  strong political opposition 
from  all  over,  including  from  his  own  party.  The  series of  secessions 
between  1957 and  1965 led to  greater military expenditures. In  addition, 
President Soekamo, who had the dominant political position between 1959 
and  1965 and  who was not  interested in  economic issues, also demanded 
higher expenditures for his pet projects. 
Table 2.1 shows that the ability of the government to raise revenue declined 
from an average of  13 percent of GDP in 1951-61 to 5 percent in  1962-66. 
However, the average ratio of annual government expenditures to GDP rose 
from 14.7 percent (1951-57)  to 18.4 percent (1958-61).  This ratio dropped 
to 9.9 percent in 1962-66,  in line with the decline in the government’s ability 
to tax.  The ratio of budget deficit to GDP has risen from 1.5 percent in the first 
phase to around 5 percent in the second and third phases. 
The size of  the government budget from 1950 to  1969 is given in table 
2.2. Column (5) of the table, which gives the budget deficit as a percentage 
of  gross expenditures, shows an exceptionally low percentage in  1956 (7.7 
percent). This was due to extensive deregulations introduced by  Professor 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, minister of  economic affairs in  the short-lived 
1955 cabinet of  Burhanudin Harahap. To  combat inflation the government 
had  liberalized imports and then released extra foreign exchange reserve to 
finance them. The increase in imports and exports raised revenue from the 
tax on foreign trade which, in turn, moderated the budget deficit. 
Table 2.3 depicts the major components of  government expenditures and 
their  rates  of  growth. The table  shows  that  roughly  half  of  government 
expenditures were for personnel and other current expenditures. Some of the 39  IndonesidChapter 2 
lbble 2.2  Government Budget 1950-69 (in  billions of rupinhs) 
Gross  Gross  Total Budget  Deficits as 
Year  Revenue  Expenditure  Deficits  96 of  (3) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1950  7.00  8.70  -  1.7  -  19.5 
1951  11.80  10.60  1.2  11.3 
1952  12.30  15.00  -2.7  -  18.0 
1953  13.60  15.70  -2.1  -  13.4 
1954  12.50  15.40  -2.9  -  18.8 
1955  14.20  16.30  -2.1  -  12.9 
1956  19.20  20.80  -  1.6  -7.7 
1957  20.60  25.60  -5.0  -  19.5 
1958  25.30  35.50  -  10.2  -28.7 
1959  30.50  44.30  -  13.8  -31.2 
1960  49.82  58.34  -8.5  -  14.6 
1961  62.20  88.50  -26.3  -29.7 
1%2  75.00  122.1  -47.1  -38.6 
1963  161.00  329.80  -  168.8  -51.2 
1964  282.10  681.30  -399.2  -58.6 
1965  960.77  2,526.32  -  1,565.6  -62.0 
1966  13.14  29.43  -  16.3  -55.3 
1967  60.2  87.55  -27.3  -31.2 
1968  149.8  185.3  -35.5  -  19.2 
1969  45.9  58.6  -  12.7  -21.7 
1%9/70  251.6  342.7  -91.1  -26.6 
Source:  Bank Indonesia, Annual Reporr, various issues; World Bank sources. 1966 on: data in new rupiahs 
(1 new = 1,ooO old). 1969: Jan-Mar.  1%9/70  fiscal year that  begins 1 April  1969. 
current  expenditures were  subsidies  for  public  utilities  and  state-owned 
enterprises.  The  next  biggest  expenditure item  was  for  defense,  which 
accounted for between 20 to (nearly) 47 percent of  the budget throughout 
1950-65.  The share of  defense outlays as a portion of  total expenditures 
markedly increased during 1958-62  and again in 1965 to meet the security 
crises  in  these  periods.  Increases  in  the  shares of  current  and  defense 
expenditures reduced the shares of outlays for economic and social services, 
as well as for investment. Since 1963 the share of investment expenditure 
rose significantly, mainly to finance pet projects of the president such as the 
Senayan  Sport  Complex,  the  National  Monument,  the  massive  Istiqlal 
mosque, and the giant Ganefo complex. 
As shown in the lower section of table 2.3, the annual average growth rate 
of government expenditures increased from 15.8 percent in 1950-57  to 36.3 
percent  in  1958-61,  and  then jumped  to  275  percent  during  1962-66. 
During the first phase, the rate of growth of  government expenditures was 
roughly equal to the  average annual inflation rate at  15.8 percent.  Since 
1958,  however,  the  rate  of  growth  of  government  expenditure  has 
consistently been higher than the inflation rate. 
The structure of  government revenue, as shown in table 2.4, was heavily 
dependent upon taxing foreign trade (import and export taxes). As  a result, 
tax revenue was quite sensitive to foreign trade activities and to government 40  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
Table 2.3  Major Components of  Government Expenditures, 1951-66  (in millions 
of rupiahs) 
Economic  Social  Other Current 
Year  Defense  Service  Service  Expenditure  Investment  Total 
1951  3,269  (30.8) 
1952  3,032  (20.2) 
1953  3,892  (24.9) 
1954  3,327  (22.0) 
1955  3,937  (24.1) 
1956  4,075  (20.4) 
1957  6,051  (23.6) 
1958  11,085  (31.4) 
1959  14,071  (31.7) 
1960  22,431  (38.5) 
1961  41,607  (46.5) 
1962  57,438  (46.6) 
1963  97,900  (29.7) 
1964  195,200  (28.7) 
1965  1,009,100  (40.0) 
















~  ~~  ~~~~  ~~  ~ 
1,034  (9.7)  5,343  (50.3)  666  (6.3)  10,625 
1,435  (9.6)  7,726  (51.4)  1,074  (7.1)  15.025 
1,245  (8.0)  8,005  (51.1)  938  (6.0)  15,659 
1,436  (9.5)  7,401  (48.9)  1,133  (7.5)  15,141 
1,564  (9.6)  8,302  (50.9)  1,030  (6.3)  16.316 
2,120  (10.6)  11,642  (58.2)  1,180  (5.9)  20,001 
2,334  (9.1)  15,078  (58.9)  1,065  (4.2)  25,610 
2,884  (8.2)  18,646  (52.8)  1,294  (3.7)  35,313 
3,124  (7.0)  23,279  (52.5)  1,949  (4.4)  44.350 
5,083  (8.7)  23,962  (41.1)  3,824  (6.6)  58,336 
6,945  (7.8)  27,678  (30.0)  7,051  (7.9)  89,499 
6,816  (5.5)  48,880  (39.7)  4,510  (3.7)  123,259 
23,000  (7.0)  47,000  (14.3)  108,300  (32.8)  329,800 
41,400  (6.1)  144,900  (21.3)  259,100  (38.0)  681.300 
108,Mx)  (4.3)  354,000  (14.0)  860,200  (34.1)  2,525.700 
18,400  (75.5)  -  -  3,700  (15.2)  24,360 
Averagc  Annual  Rates ot Growth 
1951-57  193-6  I  I962  ~  66  I95  I -66 
Defense  10.8  55.4  150.5  54.6 
Economic Cervicr  23.0  64.2  225.6h  22.5’ 
Social \ervice  14.5  34.0  620.8  92.0 
Other current expenditure  18.9  14  I  93.P  34.9’ 
Investment  81  76.0  435.2  77.7 
Total expenditure  15.8  36.3  274.9  67.5 
Inflation rate  24.4  36.6  330.0  123.0 
Source  Biro Pusat Statistik 
Now. Dash indicatec that data were not available. Figures in parentheses are expenditures as a percentage  of 
the total. 
“In new rupiahs  beginning 1966 (I new rupiah equals  1,000 old rupiahs). 
”Avcrage growth ratea  for  1962-65 
‘Average  growth ratch for 1951  -65. 
policies toward the trade sector. Tax collection from the foreign trade sector 
was easy to administrate and faced practically no political opposition since 
the taxes were paid by  foreigners (Dutch trading firms until  1958) or by  the 
Chinese who dominated foreign trade activities. Revenue from the external 
sector was also raised by  instituting different exchange rates for exports and 
imports. The result of multiple exchange rates was an upsurge in smuggling 
exports  and  imports.  This  illegal  trade  reduced  the  government’s  tax 
revenue. At  the  same time,  the high  inflation rate and the inefficiency of 
domestic  tax  administration eroded  revenue  from  personal  and  business 
income taxes. The share of nontax revenue increased steadily from 1959 on 
as there was  an increasing contribution to  the treasury  of  profit  from the 
newly nationalized state enterprises. 41  IndonesidChapter  2 
Table 2.4  Sources of Government Revenue 195169 (in percentages) 
~~  ~  ~~ 
Personal  Business 
Income  Income  Other Tax  Tax on  Import  Export  Nontax  Development 
Year  Tax  Tax  on Income"  Consumption  Tax  Tax  Revenue  Revenue 
1951  6.6  6.4  .3  17.1  53.6  12.7  3.3  .o 
1952  8.6  9.3  .3  20.5  35.9  18.8  6.7  .o 
1953  9.0  11.1  .4  22.5  32.6  10.3  13.2  .o 
1954  12.4  15.7  .5  28.8  25.7  9.9  6.9  .o 
1955  12.1  17.5  .7  25.1  28.6  10.6  5.4  .o 
1956  9.5  10.0  .3  19.4  43.6  4.0  13.2  .o 
1957  9.9  10.3  .3  26.2  25.7  19.2  8.8  .o 
I958  10.4  9.9  .4  25.9  23.2  20.3  9.8  .o 
1959  8.6  10.9  .3  20.2  28.3  20.9  10.6  .o 
1960  6.6  10.3  .4  21.7  18.9  13.3  27.4  1.3 
1961  5.3  13.5  .4  19.8  10.8  5.4  29.4  15.6 
1962  8.4  15.2  .2  30.7  6.5  6.6  30.3  2.1 
1963  8.0  12.4  .6  26.1  8.1  1.1  43.4  .3 
1964  10.1  14.5  .5  27.2  12.0  .3  34.7  .8 
1965  4.7  9.2  15.2  27.8  5.6  .o  37.5  .o 
1966  4.9  4.6  4.1  37.1  28.1  15.0  6.2  .o 
1967  3.7  12.7  3.4  17.2  19.9  12.5  1.5  29.1 
1968  5.1  18.9  3.6  15.6  23.4  11.7  2.6  19.2 
1969  3.6  19.1  4.6  15.1  22.0  7.4  .9  27.2 
Source:  1951-65:  Bank  Indonesia,  Annual  Reporr.  1951-52  through  1960-65  issues.  1966-69:  Bank 
Indonesia, Indonesiun Financial Statistics. monthly bulletin, July 1969. 
"Includes land tax. 
2.4  The Monetary Purges 
The  government  of  the  newly  independent  Republic  of  Indonesia  in 
January  1950 inherited two types of money in circulation. Each of the local 
governments of  the Republic of  Indonesia during the war for independence 
issued its own currency as legal tender in any temtory under its control. The 
Republican government issued currency known as Uang Republik Indonesia 
(URI)  and  the  Dutch  military  authority  issued  currency  notes  popularly 
referred to as the Nica or "Red"  money. At the end of  1949 the amount of 
URI of all types that was in circulation was estimated at about Rp 6 billion, 
and  the amount of  Dutch currency in circulation amounted to over Rp 3.3 
billion. 
To  bring  monetary  order  and  restore  stability  of  the  rupiah,  the 
government decided upon the first monetary purge in April  1950. The Nica 
money and any Java Bank notes higher than Rp 2.50 were literally to be cut 
into  two  pieces.  The  right-hand side  was  to  be  exchanged  for 3 percent 
government bonds and the left-hand side was to be exchanged for new Java 
Bank notes. Currency denominated at Rp 2.50 or less was excluded. Half of 
time and demand deposits over Rp 400 were to be exchanged for government 
bonds to be redeemed in installments within a forty-year period. The URI 
money with a denomination of  Rp 50 or more could be exchanged for the 42  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
new Java Bank notes at rates that varied from one region to another. URI 
money of  smaller denomination could be deposited with the Bank Negara 
Indonesia. 
Monetary stability brought about by the monetary purge did not remain for 
long  due  to  the  way  the  government  financed  its  budget  deficit  and  to 
transmission of  international inflation into the domestic economy during the 
Korean War boom. Lack of  confidence in government domestic economic 
policy after the monetary purge raised the income velocity of money which, 
in turn, aggravated inflationary pressures. The lack of  confidence was also 
due to  an unequal  distribution of  the burdens of  the monetary  purge  and 
inflation. The purge had sharply reduced the cash position of the business 
sector as shown by a 1.2  percent reduction in demand deposits in 195  1 (table 
2.5). To  restore normal business operations, bank credit had to be expanded 
to the business sector. By September 1950, six months after the purge, the 
total money supply exceeded the amount in circulation before the purge. 
Inflationary pressures again rose to an alarming level in  1959. This was 
due to rapid  growth of  the money  supply to finance the budget deficit, a 
Table 2.5  Money Supply and Its Composition, 195(c67 (in billions of rupiah) 
Percent of  Total  Rate of  Growth (96) 
Demand  Total  Income 
Currency  Deposit  Money  Demand  Demand  Money  Velocity 
Year  (C)  (DD)  (M)  Currency  Deposit  Currency  Deposit  Supply  ofMoney 
1950  2.58 
1951  3.33 
1952  4.35 
1953  5.22 
1954  7.47 
1955  8.65 
1956  9.37 
1957  14.09 
1958  19.87 
L959  26.38 
1960  34.08 
1961  48.54 
1962  102.28 
1963  175.46 
1964  447.00 
1965  1,811.00 
1966  14.36 
1967  34.10 
1968  74.68 
1969  115.70 
1.73  4.31 
1.71  5.03 
2.26  6.60 
2.27  7.49 
3.64  11.12 
3.59  12.23 
4.02  13.39 
4.82  18.91 
9.49  29.37 
8.50  34.88 
13.76  47.84 
19.10  67.64 
33.62  135.90 
87.90  263.36 
278.00  725.00 
761.00  2,572.00 
7.85  22.21 
17.37  51.47 
39.21  113.89 
67.74  183.44 
59.9  40.1 
66.1  33.9 
65.9  34.1 
69.7  30.3 
67.2  32.8 
70.7  29.3 
70.0  30.0 
74.5  25.5 
67.7  32.3 
75.6  24.4 
71.2  28.8 
71.8  24.7 
75.3  33.0 
67.0  38.4 
61.6  29.6 
70.4  35.3 
64.7  33.8 
66.2  34.4 
65.6  36.9 





















10.9  30.2 
-1.2  16.7 
32.2  31.2 
.4  13.5 
60.4  48.5 
-1.4  10.0 
12.0  9.5 
19.9  41.2 
%.9  55.3 
-10.4  18.8 
61.9  37.2 
38.8  41.4 
76.0  100.9 
161.5  93.8 
216.3  175.3 
173.7  254.8 
931.5  763.5 
121.3  131.7 
125.7  121.3 





















Source:  BPS, Srarisrical Pocketbook of  Indonesia, various issues. 
Notes.  Income velocity of money is defined as Yr/[l/z([Mt-  11 + MI)],  where Yr = GDP  at time f and Mr  = 
money supply at time t. 
New  rupiah since  1966. 
Dash indicates that data were not  available. 43  IndonesidChapter 2 
reduction in  exports as a result  of  the nationalization of  foreign firms in 
1957, as well  as the closing of  non-Indonesian Chinese rural  stores. The 
black  market  value  of  the  rupiah  responded  to  the  surge in  inflation by 
dropping sharply from Rp  100 to Rp 150 per U.S. dollar between April and 
July  1959. 
On 25 August 1959 the government undertook a monetary purge for the 
second time. Bank notes with a value of  Rp 500 or Rp 1000 had their face 
values reduced by a factor of ten. Ninety percent of all bank deposits of Rp 
25,000 or more were frozen. The purge reduced the volume of  currency in 
circulation from Rp 34 billion to Rp 21 billion overnight. The government 
also devalued the rupiah by  almost 300 percent and increased taxes on trade. 
A 20 percent tax was put on all exports, and imports were classified into six 
categories with tariffs ranging up to 200 percent. 
The price  stability brought by  the  second monetary purge  and  the  tax 
increases  again  did  not  last  long.  Government  expenditures on  prestige 
projects financed by  money creation started up  again in  1961. To  induce 
external aid  as a way  to contain the renewed inflation, in May  1963 the 
government implemented a stabilization program designed by  the IMF. The 
program was a combination of budget austerity, relaxation of price controls, 
introduction of new foreign exchange regulations to encourage exports, and 
tight money policy. The effects of  the stabilization program were dramatic 
but  short-lived. The availability of foreign aid and loans increased imports 
and flattened out the general price index between June and August. 
In  September  1963  Indonesia  entered  into  a  political  conflict  with 
Malaysia. The resulting increase in military expenditures widened the budget 
deficit so much that the stabilization program was undermined. Diversion of 
resources and transportation facilities from the civilian sector for military use 
reduced the productive capacity  of  the economy. In  April  1964 the  IMF 
stabilization program was formally abrogated. The government reverted to 
money-financing the budget deficits and reimposed extensive price controls. 
The money  supply increased by  156 percent in  1964, 283 percent in  1965, 
and  764 percent  in  1966. Under such circumstances, price controls were 
unable to curb the inflation rate. 
2.5  The Foreign Sector 
The Indonesian economy was heavily dependent on the export of a narrow 
range  of  primary  products  such as rubber,  crude oil,  tin,  palm  oil,  and 
coffee. Rubber, for example, accounted for about 45  percent of  the total 
value of  Indonesia’s exports in  1955 and  in  1960 (table 2.6).  Export of 
petroleum amounted to 23 percent of the total value of exports in 1955 and 
26 percent in 1960; copra accounted for nearly 4.5 percent of the total export 
proceeds in  1955 and 4 percent in  1960. The figures for tin were 6 percent in 
1955 and in 1960. Table 2.6  Export by Commodity as Rercentage of Total Exports (1951-69) 
~~  ~~  ~  ~ 
1951  1952  1953  1954  1955  I956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  I965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
Rubber 
Petroleum and petroleum 
Tin and tin ore 




Palm oil and palm kernels 
Other 
Rubber 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products 
Tin and tin ore 




Palm oil and palm kernels 
Other 
products 
50.6  44.9  33.0 
14.3  20.5  24.5 
6.3  9.2  9.9 
10.3  6.0  7.8 
1.7  1.9  3.7 
2.8  2.5  2.9 
1.8  2.5  3.0 
2.9  3.3  4.1 
9.4  9.3  11.2 
7.8  7.2  5.5 
69.1  76.5  78.7 
0.5  0.5  0.4 
6.1  4.2  3.4 
0.2  0.2  0.3 
0.4  0.3  0.2 
0.1  0.1  0.1 
1.3  1.5  1.4 



















45.4  40.1  36.0 
22.8  25.5  33.3 
6.3  7.2  5.6 
4.5  5.1  4.4 
1.7  3.4  3.0 
3.3  3.4  3.1 
2.9  3.3  3.5 
2.8  3.5  3.1 
10.3  8.7  8.0 
5.8  5.0  3.6 
79.5  80.8  86.8 
0.4  0.4  0.2 
3.2  3.0  2.4 
0.2  0.4  0.3 
0.2  0.3  0.2 
0.1  0.1  0.1 
1.3  1.3  0.9 
9.4  8.8  5.6 
By Value 
34.6  45.0  44.9  39.0  43.8  35.2 
37.4  30.7  26.3  33.1  31.7  38.6 
5.0  3.9  6.0  4.2  5.1  2.7 
2.8  3.6  4.1  5.1  2.7  2.5 
2.4  2.0  1.6  1.8  1.8  2.9 
3.3  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.0  2.6 
4.0  2.6  3.4  3.1  2.4  2.7 
3.7  2.6  2.9  3.1  3.1  3.4 
6.9  6.4  7.6  7.4  6.5  9.5 
3.7  4.9  3.6  3.6  4.7  3.3 
By Volume 
86.8  84.7  86.1  86.2  85.0  86.6 
0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1 
1.5  1.0  1.0  1.3  1.4  0.6 
0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5 
0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
1.1  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6 
6.1  8.0  7.2  7.5  7.4  8.0 
32.6  31.4 
36.9  38.5 
4.4  5.7 
3.9  2.6 
3.7  4.5 
2.4  1.8 
3.0  2.7 
4.3  4.5 
9.0  8.5 
3.3  3.6 
88.6  88.1 
0.1  0.1 
0.9  1.3 
0.3  0.5 
0.2  0.2 
0.1  0.1 
0.7  0.8 



















25.3  24.0 
36.2  42.2 
7.8  5.6 
2.0  3.5 
6.8  6.2 
1.5  2.2 
2.2  2.0 
4.1  3.3 
14.1  10.9 
3.0  2.8 
87.1  87.1 
0.1  0.1 
1.3  1.2 
0.6  0.3 
0.1  0.1 
0.1  0.0 
0.8  0.7 
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Table  2.7  shows an almost continuous deficit in the goods and services 
account during  1951-66.  As has been  pointed out earlier, since economic 
policies  had  been  subordinated  to  political  maneuvering,  government 
expenditure could not be cut. The only adjustment measures that could be 
taken by  the government were to  reduce private consumption and private 
investment expenditures. To  achieve the reduction in private spending, the 
government  used  a  mixture  of  devaluation,  tariff,  trade  restrictions,  and 
export-inducement certificates. 
Devaluation gives  a  price  incentive in  domestic currency to  factors of 
production in the traded sector. The price incentive is expected to encourage 
the movement of  factors from the  nontraded  to the traded sector, thereby 
changing the structure of the economy to a more efficient one. The growth in 
output and the structural change in the economy, however, did not happen in 
Indonesia due to political instabilities and extensive dirigisme. 
Undoubtedly,  quantitative  import  restrictions  are  more  effective  in 
restraining imports than a devaluation or a tariff, since their effects can be 
felt immediately. However, the resulting distortions decrease the efficiency 
of  the economy and ultimately its growth potential. 
The first system of  export-inducement certificates was introduced on  11 
March  1950. In  this  system,  exporters  were required to  sell their export 
proceeds  to  the  Foreign  Exchange  Fund,  LAAPLN  (Lembaga Alat-Alat 
Pemabayaran Luar Negeri). In addition to the countervalue in rupiah at the 
official exchange rate  (Rp 3.80/U.S.$),  they  received a certificate to  buy 
foreign exchange equal  to  50  percent  of  the  rupiah value of  the  foreign 
exchange they turned in. The export certificates could be  sold in the  free 
market at a pegged price which was equal to 200 percent of the official rate. 
The buyers who wanted to use foreign exchange were required to turn  in 
certificates equal to the full countervalue of  the foreign exchange.  In this 
system, therefore, exporters received 200 percent of  the official exchange 
rate,  importers  paid  300  percent,  and  the  government  collected  the 
difference as tax revenue. 
However,  the  constant  need  for  additional  government  revenue  made 
sustained  export  promotion  efforts  impossible.  On  4  February  1952 the 
government imposed “additional export duties”  on a wide range of  export 
products to  supplement the existing 8 percent general rate.  The so-called 
strong products, such as rubber and copra, were subject to an additional 25 
percent  export  tax,  while  the  “weak  products,”  such  as  tin,  palm  oil, 
petroleum, and coffee, were subject to an additional 15 percent export tax. 
And  finally, in February 1953 the export certificate system was abolished. 
The Burhanudin Harahap government introduced a major economic policy 
reform  on  1  September  1955.  To  encourage  exports,  the  authorities 
introduced  a  new  export  certificate,  the  BPE  (Bukti Pendorong  Ekspor) 
system. Export premium in the new system was given in foreign exchange, 
unlike in the old one which gave it in local currency. The percentage amount Table 2.7  Indonesia’s Balance of  Payments, 1950-69  (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1950  195  1  1952  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959 















Private, exclusive  banks 
Long-term loans 
Total current transaction 
Oil companies investment 




Government and banks 
Long-term loans 
Short-term loans 
Liabilities to IMF & IBRD 
Other short-term loan movements 
Long-term improvements 
Short-term improvements 
Foreign exchange & gold holdings 
Foreign exchange holdings 
Monetary gold holdings 








-  10.0 
-24.1 


























































-265.4  -  135.8 
-981.4  -787.4 
-90.9  66.1 
890.5  853.5 
0.0  1.7 
-9.3  -7.9 
-11.1  -13.1 
-  12.1  -  12.9 
-38.0  -54.3 
-  18.6  -  16.1 
-32.3  -44.4 
-53.1  -54.9 
1.3  3.3 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
-258.2  -  132.5 
7.9  1.6 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-78.4  -1.2 
0.0  26.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-  181.1  89.6 
-44.2  5.6 
-295.7  115.5 
37.5  16.9 
-40.6  102.2 
61.1  251.0 
769.8  877.4 
-708.7  -626.4 
0.3  0.1 
-6.8  -7.1 
-7.7  -13.3 
-9.7  -12.4 
-70.3  -  107.6 
-7.5  -8.5 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
2.7  1.3 
0.6  0.4 
2.1  0.9 
-44.1  103.5 
-0.4  0.4 
15.8  25.6 
-16.2  -25.2 
-0.8  0.7 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-2.4  -  15.9 
0.0  0.0 
14.9  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-22.6  97.6 
55.3  8.9 
44.1  -  103.5 
0.0  0.0 







-  12.7 


























































-  96.9 
83.6 
961.2 





















-  17.9 
0.0 
0.0 
-  170.9 
2.2 






-582.  I 
0.0 























-  124.2 
4.8 
-  18.9 
-22.8 
816.9 
8.7 1960  1961  1962  I963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 















Privare, exclusive  banks 
Long-term loans 
Total current transaction 
Oil companies investment 




Governmenr and banks 
Long-term loans 
Short-term loans 
Liabilities to IMF & IBRD 
Other short-term loan movements 
Long-term improvements 
Short-term improvements 
Foreign exchange & gold holdings 
Foreign exchange holdings 
Monetary gold holdings 


























-  19.0 
38.5 
0.0 
-  22.2 
0.0 
-42.6 










-  3.4 
-86.3 







-  11.7 
















-  248.4 
-25.4 
710.8 






































































-  1.2 
-92.6 
-52.7 























-  248.0 
39.0 
634.0 
-  595.0 
0.0 











































-  117.0 
-  16.0 
















-  282.0 
-35.0 
770.0 
-  805.0 
0.0 
-4.0 










-  10.0 





















-  14.0 
-  3.0 
-92.0 
-  78.0 
-23.0 




























-  10.0 
-  3.0 
-  107.0 
-  107.0 
























~  ~~  ~  ~~~~ 
Source;  Bank  Indonesia, Annual Report. various issues. 
Nore: N.A. = data not available. n.i.e.  = not  included elsewhere. 48  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
of  export  premium  was  divided into eight  groups ranging  from  2  to  20 
percent. The BPE certificate could be sold in  the free market within three 
months. In early September 1956 the free market value of the BPE certificate 
was 260 percent of the official rate. 
On  20 June 1957 the Monetary Board replaced the BPE certificate with 
the BE (Bukti Ekspor) certificate. The BE certificates, valued in rupiah at the 
official exchange rate (Rp  11.40), could be sold in the free market within 
two  months.  Purchase of  the  BE  certificates was  restricted to  holders of 
import  permits  and  licenses and  of  transfer  permits.  A  20  percent  levy 
known as PBE (Pembuyuran Bukti Ekspor) was collected by the government 
from  exports  of  goods  and  services.  The  market  price  of  the  new  BE 
certificate immediately soared to 220 percent of the official rate. At the end 
of  1957 it rose to 250 percent and then to 332 percent in March  1958. In 
April 1958, however, the government ended the market determination of the 
BE exchange rate by fixing its value. The BE system was officially ended in 
August 1959. 
The vacillating treatment of  the export sector described above character- 
izes  very  weil  the  inability  of  the  government  to  conduct  consistent 
economic policies within  any reasonable time horizon.  The on-again and 
off-again use of  export incentives continued until the end of  the Soekarno 
regime: the SIVA (Surat Zjin Vulutu Asing)  export certificate in March 1962, 
the Additional Export-Inducement certificate and Special Export certificate 
in May  1963, and the SPP (Surat Pendorang Produksi) export certificate in 
April 1964. None of these export certificate schemes lasted long because the 
tension between  taxing  exports  in  order to  reduce the  budget  deficit  and 
promoting exports in order to attenuate the balance-of-payments deficit was 
never resolved. 
2.6  The End of the Soekarno Regime 
The internal political struggle culminated with  the abortive coup by  the 
communists on the night  of  30 September  1965. The political instability 
aggravated the economic instability.  A combination of  drastic devaluation 
and  a third  monetary  purge on December  13 had  no effect in  controlling 
inflation. The increasing economic difficulties due to those measures speeded 
up the transfer of  authority from President Soekarno to General Soeharto in 
the following year. Appendix 
Table A2.1  Expenditure on GNP at Constant 1960 Prices (in billions of rupiahs) 









GDP at constant 
GDP at current 
prices 
prices 
311.4  335.8 
45.1  42.0 
(-6.9) 
30.7  44.1 
(43.6) 
52.0  56.7 
(9 0) 
49.0  66.0 
(34.7) 
390.2  412.6 
(7.8) 



























































































448.0  478.8  531.0 
945.2  2.102.9  2,830.7 
Source:  Biro Pusat Statistik. 
Note;  Figures  in parentheses  are growth rates Table A2.2 
Sector  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1%3  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
Rrcentage Distribution of National Income by Sector of  Origin, 1953-69. 
Agriculture 
Peasant food crops 





Minus: export duties 




Trade & financial 
Other 
Government 
57.0  58.0  56.0  55.0  52.6  56.0  55.2  53.9  47.9  59.0  57.9  55.4  58.7  53.3  53.9  51.0  49.3 
36.2  36.9  36.2  36.6  35.5  40.4  35.3  34.4  27.3  42.8  37.7  38.0  35.8  33.8  35.5  34.6  30.3 
7.9  7.9  8.0  7.1  6.7  3.6  7.7  7.2  7.2  5.4  6.8  5.7  9.1  5.9  5.4  6.3  7.3 
4.5  3.8  3.8  3.5  3.4  3.2  3.1  3.3  2.9  2.6  2.3  2.6  3.6  2.6  2.3  2.2  2.5 
4.2  4.9  4.6  4.5  4.2  5.0  4.7  4.8  4.7  3.6  3.7  2.8  3.5  2.6  3.9  2.5  3.3 
3.0  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.6  3.0  2.2  2.4  2.5  1.4  1.2  2.3  .9  .8  .7  1.7  2.2 
2.3  2.2  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.6  2.0  1.9  3.4  3.1  6.1  4.0  5.8  7.7  6.2  3.6  3.7 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.1  .6  .9  .9  .9  .8  - 
43.0  42.0  44.0  45.0  47.4  44.0  44.8  46.1  52.1  41.0  42.1  44.6  41.3  46.7  46.1  49.0  50.7 
12.0  11.8  12.2  12.5  14.7  11.0  16.5  14.4  15.4  11.1  12.2  17.2  11.9  11.1  12.1  15.2  17.2 
23.1  22.5  23.2  23.4  23.1  19.3  23.2  27.2  31.0  27.3  26.2  24.6  25.8  30.4  29.2  28.2  28.5 
11.8  15.3  18.7  16.1  15.6  14.5  13.2  19.5  18.0  17.5  18.3 
11.4  11.9  12.4  11.3  10.6  10.2  12.6  10.9  11.1  10.7  10.2 
7.9  7.7  8.6  9.1  10.2  13.7  5.0  4.5  5.6  2.5  3.8  2.7  3.6  5.1  4.8  5.6  5.0 
Source:  1953-58:  Biro Perancang Negara (1960, 101) 1959-66:  BPS, Sfafistical  Pocketbook of Indonesia,  various issues 
Nofe: Dash indicates that data were not available. 
"Based on current prices. 
bIncludes mining,  manufacturing, construction,  and utilities. 51  IndonesidChapter 2 
lsble A2.3  Expenditure Composition of  National Income (GDP), 1960-69  (in percentages) 
private  Government 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 1961  I962  1963  I964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 











Mining (billion kgs) 
Crude petroleum 
Natural  gas 






























































































































































Sources: BPS, Statistical Yearbook of  Indonesia, various issues. Bank Indonesia, Yearly Report, various issues 54  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
Table A2.5  Population of  Indonesia, 1930-76 
Population (millions)  Annual Growth Rate (0) 
1930  1961  1971  1976  1930-61  1961-71  1971-76 
Java-Madura 
Rural  - 
Urban  - 
Total  41.7 
Outer Islands 
Rural  - 
Urban  - 
Total  18.9 
Indonesia 
Rural  - 
Urban  - 
Total  60.6 
53.2  62.4  67.9  -  1.6 
9.8  13.7  15.1  -  3.4 
63.0  76. I  83.0  I .4  I .9 
29.5  36.0  40.2  -  2.0 
4.6  7. I  8.6  -  4.4 
34.0  43.1  48.8  1.9  2.4 
82.7  98.4  108.1  -  1.8 
14.4  20.8  23.7  -  3.7 










Note:  Dash indicates that data were not available. Table  A2.6  Distribution and Size of  Work Force in Indonesia, 19-76  (in percentages) 
Indonesia  Java-Madura  Outer Islands 
Sector  1930  1961  1971  1976  1930  1%1  1971  1976  1930  1961  1971  1976 
Agricultural  68.8  73.6  66.2  62.0  64.3  69.4  61.4  58.7  79.5  81.6  75.4  68.4 
Manufacturing  10.6  7.8  9.9  10.1  11.6  9.1  11.4  11.3  8.3  5.2  6.9  7.9 
Trade  7.7  8.9  13.5  17.3  8.5  10.2  15.9  18.9  5.7  6.6  9.0  14.1 
Services  12.9  9.7  10.4  10.6  15.6  11.2  11.3  11.1  6.5  6.6  8.7  9.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Total number (millions)  20.9  34.8  44.1  51  14.4  22.7  28.8  33.2  6.2  12. I  15.3  17.8 
Annual growth (percent)  1.7  2.4  3.0  I .4  2.4  2.9  2.2  2.4  3.1 
Source:  David 0. Dapice (1980) 